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During the past few years, I have written extensively on the subject of
transnational bribery. My articles have examined several aspects of this se-
rious problem,' including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"), 2 re-
* Bobbie and Coulter R. Sublett Centennial Professor, University Distinguished Teaching
Professor, University of Texas at Austin. B.A., Hofstra University; M.A., Dartmouth Col-
lege; J.D., College of William and Mary, M.A., Ph.D., Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania.
1 Bribery is a serious problem for a variety of reasons. In discussing corruption in Africa,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Whitney W. Schneidman summarizes the problem suc-
cinctly:
Corruption in Africa is of particular concern because it undermines the emerging political
and economic institutions in these countries and threatens the ongoing political and eco-
nomic reforms in the region. It corrodes democratic institutions, weakens the rule of lav,
and undermines the confidence of people in democracy. Corruption, as illustrated by the
illicit trade of national resources, is also theft from a nation. It robs citizens in Africa of
their future and has a debilitating impact on their quality of life. As a consequence, poorly
managed resources, embezzlement, and corruption result in fewer funds allocated to gov-
ernment programs m education, healthcare, housing, physical infrastructure (such as, wa-
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 21:435 (2001)
cent multilateral global conventions to fight bribery,3 and the comparative
costs and benefits of legislative versus systemic or institutional forms of
change.4 This body of work also has addressed some of the problems that
can accompany aggressive legal remedies, such as potential cultural imperi-
alism5 and global discord.6
This examination has been rewarding, and it has spurred a rich ex-
change with a number of very talented scholars, as the late 1990s has seen a
renewed interest in legal research on the subjects of bribery and corruption.
ter and sanitary systems, roads) and other social services.
Prepared Testimony of Whitney W. Schneidman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bu-
reau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State Before the Senate Forein Relations
Committee African Affairs Subcommittee, Sept. 21, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Allnws File.
2 See Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 229 (1997).
3 See Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribey: A Premature Evocation of
the Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 223 (1999) [hereinafter Salbu, Premature
Evocation]; Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Har-
mony, 20 INCH. J. INT'L L. 419 (1999) [hereinafter Salbu, Threat to Global Harmony].
4 See Steven R. Salbu, Battling Global Corruption in the New Millennium, 31 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 47 (1999) [hereinafter Salbu, Battling Global Corruption]; Steven R.
Salbu, A Delicate Balance: Legislation, Institutional Change, and Transnational Bribery, 33
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 657 (2000) [hereinafter Salbu, Delicate Balance]; Steven R. Salbu, In-
formation Technology in the War against Corruption: The Next Frontier of Institutional Re-
form, 38 HARV. J. ONLEGIS. 67 (2001) [hereinafter Salbu, Information Technology].
5 See Salbu, Premature Evocation, supra note 3.
6 See Salbu, Threat to Global Harmony, supra note 3.
7 Most notably, Professor Phil Nichols of the University of Pennsylvania has generated
and participated in an exciting exchange of ideas regarding transnational bribery. See Philip
M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation,
24 YALE J. INT'L L. 257 (1999) [hereinafter Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery];
Philip M. Nichols, Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and Desirable In-
ternational Policy Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Century? In-
creasing Global Security by Controlling International Bribery, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 451
(1999) [hereinafter Nichols, Increasing Global Security]. This present Perspective is like-
wise part of a dialogue with Tom Dunfee and David Hess, also of the University of Pennsyl-
vania. See Thomas W. Dunfee & David Hess, Getting from Salbu to the "Tipping Point"
The Role of Corporate Action Within a Portfolio of Anti-Corruption Strategies, 21 NW. J.
INT'L L. & BUS. 471 (2001). A more general exchange of ideas was held at Cornell Law
School in April of 2000, which recently culminated in a collection of articles in a special
symposium issue of the Cornell Journal of International Law. For a sample of articles by
this group of leading contemporary scholars in this field, see Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara
Crutchfield George, Expansion of SEC Authority into Internal Corporate Governance: The
Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (A Twentieth Anniversary Re-
view), 7 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 119 (1998); Duane Windsor & Kathleen A. Getz, Re-
gional Market Integration and the Development of Global Norms for Enterprise Conduct, 38
Bus. & Soc. 415 (1999); Beverley Earle, The United States'Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
and the OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won't Work, Try the
Money Argument, 14 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 207 (1996); Mark B. Bader & Bill Shaw, Amendment
of the Foreign CorruptPractices Act, 15 N.Y.U. I INT'L L. & PoL. 627 (1983).
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Yet detailed legal scholarship, like all highly specialized academic work,
can leave us eager for more of the big picture. This Perspective reflects my
own desire to take a step back from the issues I have addressed to date, and
ask a basic question that may help frame some legal scholarship on bribery
and corruption in the future: what are the big questions that we should be
addressing in regard to these challenges as we enter the 21st century?
The term "big questions" could refer to a variety of things-for exam-
ple, it could refer to macro-level issues,8 or it could refer to those issues
least exhaustively addressed to date, or it could refer to those issues that are
most pressing because they will have the greatest impact in the war against
corruption, or the greatest effect on the social ills that accompany corrup-
tion, or both. The only characterization of "big questions" that I'd like to
avoid is the macro-level characterization.
Some of the questions that I pose in the following pages are macro-
level questions. For example, there are questions of broad public policy,
such as whether non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") should supplant
governments in the fight against bribery. Likewise, there are questions of
broad philosophical scope, such as whether the payment of bribes ever can
be ethically justified. Yet I do not limit myself to macro-level questions.
The Perspective also addresses focused questions regarding very particular,
narrow policy decisions, such as the "routine government action" exemp-
tion under the FCPA.
The questions to be addressed are not all "big" in the sense of having a
broad, macro-level scope. I call the questions "big" more in the spirit of
addressing some important issues-issues likely to have an impact on the
challenges the world faces in the 21st century. They are also questions that
merit greater attention in the future, and part of my goal is to identify them
as deserving serious regard by scholars studying corruption. Finally, my
unavoidably subjective identification of this Perspective's questions as the
"big" ones cannot help but reflect my own inherent interest in them-in
short, they are questions that I personally find compelling and engaging.
What are these questions? Section II asks, can it be ethical to pay a
bribe, and if so, should our laws recognize this? Section III asks whether
the FCPA's notion of "routine government actions" creates a viable stan-
dard for distinguishing acceptable and unacceptable payments. Section IV
queries whether corporate principles can have a meaningful impact in the
battle against global corruption. Section V asks whether NGOs should sup-
plant government action in fighting global corruption.
8 The term 'macro-level" issues is my own invention in regard to the topics discussed in
this Perspective. The term refers to broad questions that concern basic or fundamental as-
pects of bribery, be they economic aspects, philosophical aspects, social aspects, etc. The
opposing term, "micro-level" issues, encompasses highly focused, particularized questions in
regard to specific practices or policy solutions.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 21:435 (2001)
One final note before jumping in-the purpose of this Perspective is
not to provide definitive answers to these questions. While I make observa-
tions and judgments, the questions are intentionally left unresolved, as they
should be. Easy answers rarely exist for big questions, and these are no ex-
ception. The goal here is to spark discussion and debate among scholars
and other commentators in their future work.
II. CAN IT BE ETHICAL TO PAY A BRIBE, AND IF SO, SHOULD
OUR LAWS RECOGNIZE THIS?
Few commentators today seriously question or criticize the war against
the institutions9 of bribery and corruption. 10 One would be hard-pressed to
find a law review article written since the passage of the FCPA in 1977 that
is anything but highly critical of corruption and its effect on many aspects
of the global economy." More recently, the finance literature has begun to
recognize the serious costs of bribery in global markets. A well-publicized
study' 2 by two prominent economists suggests that corruption can deter for-
eign direct investment.13
A number of corrupt behaviors that are broadly banned by law 14 Cannot
be ethically justified under any circumstances. It is difficult to imagine a
situation where a public official is justified in demanding a bribe, or where
a businessperson is justified in offering one that has not been requested or
demanded. When a businessperson does offer an unrequested, undemanded
91 emphasize the institutions here, in contrast to the practice of bribery and corruption.
One point of this discussion is to suggest that, even if the institution is clearly and unambi-
guously wrong, the practice of bribery under very limited circumstances can be morally am-
biguous, and arguably morally preferable, in a system where the admittedly bad institution of
bribery is entrenched.
10 See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Corruption, Legitimacy, and Human Rights: The Dialec-
tic of the Relationship, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 495, 496 (1999) (casting anti-corruption dis-
course as "re-legitimating particular conceptions of development, rule of law, democracy
and human rights that are elitist, statist and Eurocentric").
" See, e.g., articles cited supra note 7 (all agreeing that bribery is a serious problem that
needs to be carefully addressed).
12 See, e.g., Alan Beattie, Investors See Corruption as a Barrier, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 17,
2000, at 12.
13 See Beata K. Smarzynska & Shang-Jin Wei, Abstract, Corruption and Composition of
Foreign Direct Investment: Firm Level Evidence, NBER Working Paper Series, Working
Paper 7969, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7969 (last visited Nov. 24, 2000)
("Empirical tests of the hypothesis on a firm-level data set show that corruption reduces in-
ward FDI and shifts the ownership structure towards joint ventures. Technologically more
advanced finns are found to be less likely to engage injoint ventures").
14 See Scott P. Boylan, Essay, International Security in the Post-Cold War Era: Can In-
ternational Law Truly Effect Global Political and Economic Stability? Organized Crime and
Corruption in Russia: Implications for U.S. and International Law, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.





bribe, it is likewise hard to imagine how acceptance of that offered bribe
can be ethically justified.
Consider, however, another class of behavior: the payment by a busi-
nessperson of a bribe that is requested or demanded by a public official.
Ordinarily, the payment of such a bribe is no more justifiable than any of
the other types of bribes mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The excep-
tional cases are, however, more easily imagined in this category than in the
others. Consider the following example.
A developing nation is in the throes of civil war. The nation is suffer-
ing from a politically motivated famine-i.e., donations of food are avail-
able, but in order to impose pressure on dissidents, entrenched authorities
are withholding delivery of food donations and people are starving. A
number of public officials have suggested to corporate benefactors that their
donations will get past the blockade if a big enough bribe is paid. In es-
sence, although the authorities have not approved food distribution, select
individual officials are corrupt enough to defy the edict surreptitiously if the
personal emolument is high enough.
Is it unethical for a corporate decision-maker to pay the bribe? This is
not an easy question. Ethicists would likely disagree, and their disagree-
ment would reflect two equally tenable perspectives. I put forth two con-
flicting arguments, each of which is plausible under well-regarded tenets of
business ethics. These two arguments reflect, respectively, deontological
and teleological viewpoints, which are commonly recognized as two basic
models of ethical decision-making.' 5 Note that while the following are not
the only deontological and teleological responses to the preceding hypo-
thetical, they are both rational applications of these two models, and each
answer would be supportable under the tenets of its respective model.
A. Deontological Approach.
Deontological ethical decision-making is based on the recognition of
duties, such as those derived from application of Immanuel Kant's categori-
cal imperative. 16 A Kantian duty is created by virtue of our ability to say
that the duty should apply in all instances.1  A categorical imperative
15 Virtually every textbook in business ethics has a section that discusses these two ap-
proaches to ethical decision-making in business. See, e.g., JoHN W. DrENHART & JORDAN
CunNrrr, CoNrm ORARYETmcAL Issuts: BusnmssETHIcs 11-15 (1998).
16For relevant primary writings, see IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE
METAPHYSICS OF MoRALs (Lewis White Beck trans. 1959). For a brief general discussion of
Kant's categorical imperative, see O.C. FERRELL & JOHN FRAEDRICH, BusINEss ETcs:
EThncAL DECISION MAKiNG AND CASES 57-59 (3d ed. 1997).
17 Specifically, the categorical imperative states, "'Act as if the maxim of thy action were
to become by thy will a universal law of nature."' See FERRELL & FRAEDRICH, supra note
16, at 57.
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against bribery is certainly supportable. 8 The proposition that no one
should ever offer a bribe can be supported, and the proposition that no one
should ever accept a bribe likewise can be supported.' 9
If a deontological model creates a duty neither to pay nor to accept
bribes, the duty applies under all circumstances, regardless of the conse-
quences of its exercise.20 Paying and taking bribes is simply wrong, and
any plausible positive ends, such as the feeding of starving people, cannot
justify means that are inherently wrong. This approach is a highly princi-
pled one, and it suggests that what is fundamentally right or fundamentally
wrong cannot be altered situationally, simply to accommodate particular
scenarios. 2' The fact that some readers may be left feeling uncomfortable
with this deontological solution to the hypothetical at hand reflects the dif-
ficulty of living ethically in an imperfect world. Yet it also may reflect the
belief of some that deontological approaches to ethics can be overly rigid.
These readers might be more likely to apply the teleological approach dis-
cussed in the next Subsection, and their method of solving a tough ethical
challenge would be reasonable.
18 Donaldson and Dunfee create a framework from which a Kantian certainly could reach
this conclusion. They contend that bribery violates hypernorms of "necessary social effi-
ciency." See Thomas W. Dunfee & Thomas Donaldson, Book Review Dialogue, Tightening
the Ties that Bind-Defending a Contractarian Approach to Business Ethics, 37 AM. Bus.
L.J. 579, 581 (2000) ("We chose bribery to demonstrate important dimensions of ISCT in-
cluding the emphasis on defining relevant communities, correctly assigning norms to those
communities, and particularly to demonstrate the application of the hypernorm of necessary
social efficiency. We believe the issue of bribery is not only of great importance because of
its pernicious impact on global trade and its significant contribution to human misery, but
also because the corruption issues facing global firms are indeed complex and difficult We
need to understand the 'paradox of corruption' whereby bribery is 'universally disapproved'
and 'universally prevalent"'). For the original work upon which this Book Review Dialogue
excerpt focuses, see generally THOMAs DONALDSON & THOMAS W. DUNFEE, Tins THAT
BIND: A SocIAL CoNTRAcTs APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETmCS (1999).
This is not to suggest that Donaldson and Dunfee's model of integrative social contract
theory is the equivalent of Kant's categorical imperative. Although the two approaches cer-
tainly can be consistent, they are not the same. Donaldson and Dunfee's treatment of bribery
is, however, consistent with and suggestive of a Kantian approach, and could be used to sup-
port the suggestion of a categorical imperative against bribery.
19 Nichols appears to do so, at least implicitly. See Nichols, Regulating Transnational
Bribery, supra note 7, at 301-03 (building on Donaldson and Dunfee's work to support a
broad prohibition of corrupt practices).20See SIR DAVID Ross, KANT's ETHICAL THEORY: A COMMENTARY ON THE
GRUNDLEGUNG ZUR META PHYSIC DER STTE- Y44 (1954) ("Kant holds that to make our percep-
tion of the rightness of an act depend on its tendency to promote a certain end would deprive
the imperative of duty of its absolute, categorical character, it would become a hypothetical
imperative, 'Do this if you desire that').21 See PATRICK./'E HUTCHINGS, KANT ON ABSOLUTE VALUE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF
CERTAIN KEY NOTIONS IN KANT's GRouNDwoRK OF THEMETAPHYSICS OFMORALS AND OF HiS
ONTOLOGY OFPERSOAL VALUE 266 (1972) (quoting Kant regarding the importance of exer-




Teleological models of ethics suggest that right and wrong can be de-
22termined by looking at the consequences of various competing options.
For this reason, they are "consequentialist" modes of ethics.23 Under them,
"the morality of obeying the law is determined by the comparative conse-
quences of obedience and disobedience." 24
Most frequently associated with John Stuart Mill 5 and Jeremy Ben-
tham,26 teleological decision-making distinguishes the "right" choice as that
which yields the maximum net social utility, or the most pleasure for the
greatest number of people.27
The teleological model also goes by the label "utilitarianism," a word
that is revealing in its etymology. The root "utility" is something every
student of introductory economics knows well.2 Economic, rational people
are considered self-seeking, personal utility maximizers.29 A utility in eco-
nomics denotes the weight an individual places on various goals or ends, in
the form of personal satisfaction.30 We each have our own set of personal
utility preferences, 31 and these direct the ways in which we act rationally to
try to optimize our personal satisfaction.32 As Patten observes, "[w]e com-
22 See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & NORMAN E. BOWIE, ETHICAL THEORY AN Busnmuss 21 (2d
ed. 1983) (noting that teleological theories assess moral worth of actions and practices solely
by virtue of their consequences).
2 See DAMIAN GRACE & STEPHEN COHEN, BusiNEss ETHics: AUSTRALIAN PROBLEMS
AND CASES 21 (1995) (defining consequentialism as "a moral outlook which evaluates...
behaviour according to the consequences of that behaviour," and discussing ethical decision-
making models that appraise conduct by "judging how well that conduct produces the rele-
vant consequences").
24 Kent Greenawalt Promise, Benefit, and Need: Ties That Bind Us to the Law, 18 GA. L.
Rnv. 727, 745 (1984).
25 See generally JOHN STUART MILL, UTILrrARIANISM (1863).
26 See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AN LEGISLATION (1789).
27 See Jeremy Bentham, On the Principle of Utility, in Louis P. PoIMAN, THE MORAL
LIFE 227, 227-32 (2000) (putting forth the net social utility maximization conception of eth-
ics, and describing in some detail how net social utility is to be measured).
28 For discussion in a classic economics textbook, see generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL &
ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 357 (3d ed. 1985) ("Economists
have constructed a simple theory of consumer choice based on the hypothesis that each con-
sumer spends his or her income in the way that yields the greatest amount of satisfaction, or
utility").
29See C.E. FERGUSON & JuANITA M. KREPs, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 86 (2d ed. 1965)
(referring to the "fundamental thesis" that consumers spend dollars on those goods that they
believe will give them the most satisfaction).31 See id. at 86 ("The utility of a good lies in its capacity to satisfy a human want").31 See id. (observing the subjectivity of satisfaction, such that individual consumers de-
termine their own utility preferences).32 See id.
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pare groups [of options] ... choosing that group from which we can get the
greatest sum of pleasure.
33
Utilitarianism in ethics is analogous. If satisfaction or net happiness
over misery is a good thing for the economic actor, it is also a desirable
goal for the ethical actor. What changes is simply the unit of analysis. As
an ideal type, economic actors are self-seeking and therefore strive to
maximize their own personal utilities; 34 as a distinct ideal type, ethical ac-
tors recognize the legitimate claims of stakeholders other than themselves.3
These claims can trump decision-maker self-interest; therefore, ethical ac-
tors must shift the unit of analysis to "all" rather than simply "self., 36 In-
stead of acting to maximize net personal utility, the utilitarian ethical actor
seeks to maximize net social utility.3 7 Hence, we have Bentham's edict to
strive to achieve "the greatest good for the greatest number," in a sort of so-
cial cost-benefit analysis.38
There are two varieties of utilitarian analysis-act utilitarianism and
rule utilitarianism. The distinction is important here, because the plausible
moral justification for bribe-paying in the hypothetical under discussion is
based on act utilitarianism rather than rule utilitarianism. Under act utili-
tarianism, the social cost-benefit analysis is done individually and sepa-
rately for every act that is considered.3 9 The decision-maker selects the
option that maximizes net social utility in the particular situation at hand.4°
Under rule utilitarianism, the decision-maker focuses not on the one
particular act or precise situation at issue, but rather on the entire relevant
class of acts.41 She asks, 'Vhat rule, applied over all like cases, will yield
33 Simon Nelson Patten, The Theory of Dynamic Economics, in ESSAYS IN EcONOMIC
THEORY, By SIMON NELSON PATrEN 33 (Rexford Guy Tugwell ed., 1924).34 See Paul B. Stephan, Rationality and Corruption in the Post-Socialist World, 14 CONN.
J. INT'L L. 533, 538 (1999) (describing rational actors, a classic concept in economics, as
self-serving).35 See JOHN STUART MiLL's UTILrrARIANIsM: TEXT AND CarricIsM 45 (James M. Smith &
Ernest Sosa eds., 1969) ("The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power
of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others").36 See id. at 40 (incorporating the good of other people as well as ourselves into utilitari-
anism's "greatest happiness principle").37 See id.
38 See FERRELL & FRAEDRICH, supra note 16, at 54 tbl. 3-1.39 In other words, act utilitarianism evaluates net social utility on a case-by-case basis.
See Michael Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract Law
and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REv. 769, 889 (1985) (referring to act utilitarianism
as "case-by-case consideration").
40 See J.L. MAcKm, ETIcs: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 125 (1977) ("[Tihe right act
is that which will produce the most happiness, not just for the agent himself[,] but for all
who are in any way affected [by his act].").
41 See Stephanie Loomis-Price, Decision-Making in the Law: What Constitutes a Good
Decision -- The Outcome Or the Reasoning Behind It?, 12 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmIcs 623, 631
(1999) (observing that the rule utilitarian adherent asks what would happen "if everyone
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the greatest net social utility?' 42 That rule is the one she chooses as ethical.
Even if an alternative rule would yield the greatest net benefit in the
particular situation under consideration, the decision-maker selects the
option that would yield the greatest net benefit over all cases.43 Thus, an
element of principled decision-making is injected into teleology, and
situational variance is averted.
As applied to the bribery hypothetical in this Section, act utilitarian
analysis can easily recommend payment of a substantial bribe as the right
thing to do.44 Even conceding that bribery is a dysfunctional and harmful
institution,4' and conceding that payment of bribes usually is wrong, the
consequentialist easily can determine that payment of this particular bribe
will yield far more good than harm. The benefit is obvious: potentially
thousands will be spared from starvation. There are costs as well. Any one
instance of bribe paying may support the institution, which admittedly is a
very harmful one. The questions under act utilitarianism are (1) How much
does this one payment bolster the institution of bribery; (2) How much in-
cremental bribery in the future is enabled by supporting the institution?; (3)
How much harm is attributable to this incremental bribery?; and (4) Is the
resulting harm greater or less than the immediate harm averted by paying
the bribe and saving thousands of people from starvation?
Because we are dealing with a hypothetical situation, we don't have
real facts that allow us to engage in a true act utilitarian analysis. Yet we
need not do an actual analysis of this situation for the purpose at hand.
Rather, we simply must be able to posit a plausible scenario under which
the benefits of making a particular payment outweigh the costs.
Such a scenario is certainly imaginable. First, note that the entire chain
of four questions listed above depends on finding, in response to Question
1, that the payment being considered does indeed bolster the institution of
bribery. If the payment doesn't bolster the institution, the remaining three
questions simply are not triggered. The negative ripple effects of one in-
chose to act in a particular manner when faced with this same choice," and creates a rule ac-
cordingly).42 See Julie Peters Zamacona, Evidence and Ethics: Letting the Client Rest in Peace: At-
torney-Client Privilege Survives the Death of the Client, Swidler & Berlin v. United States,
118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998), 21 U. ARK. LrrrLE RoCK L. Rv. 277, 285 (1999) ("Rule-
utilitarianism calls for a one-time balancing, resulting in a firm rule to be applied in all like
situations").
13See Loomis-Price, supra note 41, at 631 (noting that rule utilitarianism is not con-
cerned with the consequences of a particular choice).44 But see Thomas W. Dunfee et al., Social Contracts and Marketing Ethics, 63 J.
MARKrnNG 14 (1999) (rejecting validity of applying act utilitarian analysis to bribery, sug-
gesting that accurate comparison of broader social costs to specific benefits of a single act is
a daunting challenge).45 See Dunfee & Donaldson, supra note 18, at 581 (describing bribery as having a "perni-
cious impact on global trade" and making a "significant contribution to human misery").
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stance of bribery are both speculative and uncertain, and a single, idiosyn-
cratic, furtive instance of bribe-paying may actually yield no incremental
future harm.46 If this be the case, and if thousands of lives could be saved
by paying the bribe, the decision-maker applying act utilitarianism would
pay the bribe to save the lives. From a teleological standpoint, payment of
a bribe under certain conditions may be considered the right thing to do.
Tax kickbacks in Italy are another interesting example that sheds light
on the question at hand: whether it ever can be acceptable to pay a bribe.
Kelly describes the Italian system: "The Italian federal corporate tax system
has an official, legal tax structure and tax rates just as the U.S. system does.
However, all similarity between the two systems ends there."4 7 Under the
Italian system, tax officials expect original filed tax returns of corporate
taxpayers to understate profits by 30 to 70 percent.48 After returns are filed,
tax officials issue taxpayers invitations to discuss, creating a system under
which taxpayers' representatives negotiate the amount that ultimately will
be collected.4 9 These representatives, called commercialistas, pay Italian
revenue agents bustarella, which Kelly classifies as a "substantial cash
payment" that "usually determines whether the final settlement is closer to
the corporation's original tax return or to the fiscal authority's original ne-
gotiating position."'o Under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, if an
Italian commercialista is acting as the agent of a U.S. taxpayer, the taxpayer
can be liable for any bustarella that the commercialista tenders to tax offi-
cials.5
1
4 The furtiveness of the payment would constrain its publicity. If it is truly furtive and
no one but the payer and taker know about it, then the bribe does not serve as a legitimating
example, attracting others toward emulation. If the payment induces no incremental future
bribery, its negative effects on the institution of bribery under act utilitarian analysis may be
negligible compared to the saving of lives. Again, it is important to remember that this
analysis does not justify either the demand of the bribe or the taking of the bribe by the pub-
lic official. Under act utilitarian reasoning, the paying of a bribe would be justified only
after it has been requested by the official holding the power to distribute the food to dying
people.47 Arthur L. Kelly, Italian Tax Mores, in CASE STUDIES 1N BusINEss, SOCIETY, AND
ETHcs 272, 272 (Thomas L. Beauchamp ed., 4t ed. 1998).
48 See id.
49 See id.
5 0 Id. at 272-73.
51 For the source of liability for acts of agents under the FCPA, see infra notes 53-55. A
conceivable way to avert liability-and it is not very plausible-is to argue that the pay-
ments are for "routine government actions." The argument is not highly persuasive because
bustarella as described by Kelly is used to purchase a financial gain via the reduction of
taxes, rather than simply to get access to universal services like water, utilities, or mail deliv-




How so? Under the FCPA, a corporation can be held liable if it knows
that its agent52 is paying a bribe,53 including a "firm belief' that the bribe is
"substantially certain to occur."'54 More specifically, the law provides that
"knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability" of an
illegal act occurring, "unless the person actually believes" that it is not.55
Given that the payment of bustarella by commercialistas is the norm in It-
aly, awareness of high probability would not be a difficult standard to meet.
A U.S. manager who hires a commercialista does so at his or her own peril,
under the FCPA's present treatment of the principal-foreign agent relation-
ship.
I have discussed this case with business students for ten years. It raises
a number of very interesting issues. Most pertinent to this Section, (1)
nearly all students believe a system to be unethical if it allocates ultimate
tax liability, and therefore proportionate tax burdens, on the basis of the size
of a kickback to a public official; and (2) nearly all students believe that it is
ethical for a U.S. manager to hire a commercialista to pay the kickback, or
at least that it would be ethical if the manager could be assured that the
payment didn't violate any laws. This schism reflects an interesting bifur-
cation of ethical attribution. Those students who support both statements
(1) and (2) above imply a belief that it can be morally defensible to tender a
bribe in a corrupt system over which one has no control, and in which brib-
ery has been institutionalized. The reasoning of those who adopt this posi-
tion is summarized in the following paragraphs.
First, let us concede that the Italian system of taxation is at very least
sub-optimal for several reasons: it perpetuates bribery, an institution widely
considered to be harmful in many ways.56 The Italian tax system also warps
the relative burdens borne by individual taxpayers. The fairest, most con-
sistent system will allocate tax burdens impartially, according to accepted
legal standards. The payment of bustarella injects an element of corrupt
52 Agency issues in real cases are complicated, as principals are likely to deny either
complicity or knowledge, and agents are likely to try to deflect responsibility by asserting
such complicity or knowledge. The messiness is exacerbated when more than one country is
involved in fact finding, and issues of extradition of witnesses arise. For one example of this
kind of situation, see Andres Oppenheimer, IBM Executives Deny Home Office Knew of
Bribes in Argentina Bureau, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 1, 2000, available in LEXIS, Nevs Li-
brary, Allnws File.
5 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(aX3)(1999).
5' 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f)(2XA)(ii), 78dd-2(hX3)(A)(ii)(1999).
5 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(hX3)(B)(1999).
56 See Brian C. Harms, Holding Public Officials Accountable in the International Realm:
A New Multi-Layered Strategy to Combat Corruption, 33 CORIELL INT'L L.J. 159, 209 n.63
(2000) (citing comment of Barbara Ettore that bribery is considered destructive to econo-
mies); Jong Bum Kim, Korean Implementation of the OECD Bribery Convention: Implica-
tions for Global Efforts to Fight Corruption, 17 UCLA PAc. BAsiN L.J. 245, 260 (1999)
(observing that bribery undermines economic development and distorts competitive condi-
tions).
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subjectivity, such that a taxpayer can reduce his or her overall costs if a
marginal contribution to the kickback is exceeded by a greater marginal re-
duction in ultimate tax liability according to the tax official's final determi-
nation. Finally, the system encourages and virtually mandates dishonesty,
as masses of taxpayers learn how to play the system, knowing that they ini-
tially must seriously underreport their earnings if they are to bear a reason-
able tax liability at the end of the Italian process.
It is one thing to say that the Italian tax-collection system is sub-
optimal, ethically or otherwise; it is another thing to say that it is unethical
to participate in that system. Clearly, there are systems that are so objec-
tionable that one ultimately declines to participate, based on moral grounds,
political-economic grounds, or both. The system of apartheid in South Af-
rica in the latter part of the twentieth century is an example of one such sys-
tem.5 7  Yet even withdrawal from the South African economy was
controversial, as one can argue that active engagement in a system creates
avenues for change that one loses through a trade embargo. 58
Now compare the Italian tax system. Is bustarella a form of bribery?
Yes. Is it illegal under the FCPA? Whether any activity is illegal under the
FCPA is frequently a tough question, because the FCPA is vague in so
many ways. As Seglun recently observed,
Bribes are tricky. Well, not the bribes themselves. Deciding what con-
stitutes a bribe and then whether you should pay one to do business in a
foreign country .... [T]he Foreign Corrupt Practices Act... leaves...
ambiguity .... [I]f the law does not provide clear guidance, how can
anyone decide how to behave?
59
This ambiguity is exacerbated by a dynamic identified by Greanias and
Windsor-the fact that payments considered commonplace and acceptable
in one culture may be considered corrupt in another 60
The FCPA's ambiguity, combined with its criminal sanctions,61 is
likely to have a chilling effect on borderline behaviors. In the instance of
bustarella, the chilling effect may be significant, considering that tax liabil-
57 See Greenbacks, ECONOMIST, Aug. 3, 1991, at 73, 73-74 (discussing how "investors'
revulsion at South African apartheid helped to bring that system down," as well as the eco-
nomic boycotts and "shunning" that formed anti-apartheid policies around the world).58 Likewise, commentators in the early 1990s began to recommend the dismantling of
vestigal sanctions as South Africa showed signs of moving away from apartheid. As one
writer observed, removal of sanctions, combined with incentives for U.S. investment, could
facilitate the fostering of democracy and freedom. See J. Daniel O'Flaherty, Holding To-
gether South Africa, FoREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct 1993, at 126, 135. Engagement thus enables
countries to share and encourage the adoption of institutions they consider desirable.59 Jeffrey L. Seglin, When Bribery is Lost in Translation, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 15, 2000, at
B8.
60 See GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE WINDSOR, THm FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
129 (1982).
6 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(gX1999).
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ity reductions do not fit convincingly into the vague category of "routine
government actions."62 Of course, the government action here-conferral
of tax liability reductions-could be considered routine in the sense that it
is commonplace in Italy. It is less likely to be considered routine by anal-
ogy to the examples enumerated in the FCPA, such as mail delivery or pro-
vision of phone service.63  The statute's catch-all provision permitting
payment for "actions of a similar nature" to those enumerated does not
specify the criteria for similarity.64 Accordingly, it would be very risky to
assume that payments for a reduction of the tax burden, however common
and widely accepted, would be classified by the U.S. government as analo-
gous to payments for basic utilities.6' Accordingly, a prudent U.S. manager
operating in Italy should probably assume that the payment of bustarella
could trigger FCPA liability.
If the FCPA did not prohibit bustarella under U.S. law, would a U.S.
businessperson be justified in paying it? Most students who study this case
say yes. The initial underreporting of tax liability might seem dishonest
under U.S. conceptions of honesty, but it may be honest under Italian con-
ceptions of honesty. If the system accepts the fact that all reports are de-
flated by a commonly accepted discount factor, then arguably, the report is
not dishonest; rather, the language and rules for reporting are simply differ-
ent. The protocol is to discount, and the reported figures simply incorporate
this protocol by virtue of common usage and understanding.
But what about the concern of more immediate relevance to this paper?
How can the payment of the bribe be justified, if the payer believes the sys-
tem to be fundamentally flawed? Again, consider an act utilitarian analysis.
The social costs of making the payment include diversion of funds from the
tax base to tax collectors' pockets, the unfair relative allocation of tax bur-
dens among taxpayers, and the support of what is at best a sub-optimal in-
stitution. The benefits include profits to shareholders that result from
participation in the Italian market, the potential opportunity to effect
changes in Italian policy by active engagement in the economy and the so-
ciety, the provision of business to the Italian people, and respect for an al-
ternative system that does not violate basic human rights. If the social
benefits outweigh the social costs, participation in the system could be justi-
fied under act utilitarianism, even in the face of ethical objections to the
system itself.
62 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(1999).
63See id.
64See id.
65 The risk of falling on the wrong side of the FCPA is significant Penalties for violation
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C. Should Our Laws Acknowledge This Ambiguity?
The intersection between law and ethics is certainly imperfect, poten-
tially by both design and accident. By design, it is possible to enact an ethi-
cally objectionable law with the goal of establishing a countervailing order,
for example. Nonetheless, as a.rule, we should prefer that there be harmony
between what is legally required and what is ethically right.
The schism identified in the preceding two Subsections suggests that
the law sometimes may require individual actors to act or refrain from act-
ing in ways they determine to be wrong, in good faith and using legitimate
ethical analysis. Should the laws seeking to control corruption exempt
good-faith behaviors that can be morally justified under a reasonable, well-
accepted mode of analysis?
There certainly is precedent for the position that law should exempt
good-faith or well-meaning behavior. Homicide is one good example. It is
hard to imagine a deontological edict more compelling than "Thou shalt not
kill.",66 When I ask students in my business ethics classes to identify the
most basic moral responsibilities of all human beings, respect for human
life and the moral law against killing other human beings is always among
the first mentioned. Not surprisingly, students consider the duty not to take
a human life as a higher-order, more fundamental duty than the duty not to
pay or take bribes. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the tablets Moses
brought down from the Mount contained a commandment against homicide,
but not one against bribery. 67
This is not to understate the harm that corruption yields. Indeed, cor-
ruption can easily lead to loss of human life, as when purchased inspection
approvals allow bridges to collapse, for example.68 Rather, the point here is
that the law provides good-faith exceptions to even the most basic deonto-
logical imperative not to kill. If one kills in defense of self or defense of
others, homicide may be deemed justifiable, 69 and the perpetrator may go
66 Exodus 20:13.
67 See id.
68 See Judge Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld: A Look at the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on its Twentieth Birthday, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 269,
280 (1998) ("What society would want to construct a major bridge, tunnel or public building
where the best company for the job was excluded because it would not bribe a government
official to procure the contract? When that bridge collapses because of faulty work, who is
going to answer that a bribe paying shoddy contractor was hired because he gave Schmier-
geld?").
69 The notion of justifiable homicide is ancient. For discussion dating back to Cicero, see
Grant M. Dawson, Defining Substantive Crimes Within the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court: What Is the Crime ofAggression?, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 413, 427 n. 66 (2000) ("....Cicero was explaining that all persons have an inherent




free.70 This legal concept of justifiable homicide receives broad popular
support.7' If homicide can be considered legally justifiable, perhaps there
should be instances in which payment of a bribe should be legally justifi-
able, too.
The hypotheticals in this Section are two examples of cases in which
the payment of a bribe could be made in good faith, and under a tenable
ethical analysis. They certainly are not the only examples. Suppose Parent
is visiting a hostile country, and her child is abducted. Corrupt public offi-
cials demand a payment for the release of the child. This kind of transac-
tion can certainly be cast as corrupt, and it would not fall under the heading
of a "routine government action" under any reasonable analysis. 72 Yet the
parent making such a payment would do so in good faith, and it would be
difficult to condemn him.
The law could easily exempt "good-faith" payments that are nonethe-
less made for corrupt purposes, and it is hard to think of a reason against
such a provision. A good-faith exemption would not undermine the spirit
of anti-bribery laws3 since most bribes are made in bad faith. It would,
however, recognize that the personal ethical issue of bribe payment is not
always clear-cut.
III. DOES THE FCPA'S NOTION OF "ROUTINE GOVERNMENT
ACTIONS" CREATE A VIABLE STANDARD FOR DISTINGUISHING
ACCEPTABLE AND UNACCEPTABLE PAYMENTS?
Under the present version of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
("FCPA"), payments made for the "routine government actions" of foreign
officials are permitted. 74 This standard is meant to exempt what are com-
monly known as "grease payments."
The "routine government actions" language replaces a provision in the
original version of the statute that allowed pa'ments to foreign officials
whose duties were "ministerial" or "clerical." This alteration certainly
70 See Sharan K. Suri, A Matter of Principle and Consistency: Understanding the Bat-
tered Woman and Cultural Defenses, 17 MIcH. J. GENDER & LAW 107, 111 n.20 (2000) (ob-
serving that justifications like self-defense are grounds for acquittal).
71 See Tziporah Kasachkoff, Killing in Self-Defense: An Unquestionable or Problematic
Defense?, 17 LAw & Pum. 509, 509 (1998) ("Although most people believe that the deliber-
ate and intentional killing of another person is generally morally wrong, many also believe
that killing another person is sometimes morally justified and sometimes even called for").
2 I elaborate on this conclusory statement later in the paper, in a Section specifically ad-
dressing issues relating to the exemption for "routine government actions." See infra Section
III.
73 This comment assumes that anti-bribery laws are to any degree effective. The pre-
sumption is debatable, but if lavs do have some impact on corruption, the impact would not
be harmed by a good-faith exemption.
74 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(hX4)(AX1999).
7S See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(2) (1982).
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makes sense, given the spirit of the exemption of grease payments under a
criminal law. If certain kinds of payments-for-service are considered in-
nocuous, then the services for which they are tendered are a better indicator
of a payer's culpability than the job descriptions of the recipients of the
payments. A foreign official whose job is essentially clerical may nonethe-
less have some powers that would enable him or her to take seriously cor-
rupt payments. By focusing on the specific reciprocal services rendered
instead of the jobs of the recipients, the law can more accurately assess the
culpability and the social effects of a particular payment.
Did the change from "ministerial" and "clerical" duties to "routine
government actions" give us a workable exemption from liability for
grease payments? As we shall see, there are several reasons to be skepti-
cal. To begin the analysis, it helps to look at the specific statutory lan-
guage that purportedly circumscribes the exemption for routine
government actions.
The statute defines and briefly discusses the term "routine gov-
ernment action":
(3) (A) The term "routine governmental action' means only an action which is
ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in-
(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a
person to do business in a foreign country;
(ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders;
(iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling
inspections associated with contract performance or inspections related to transit
of goods across country;
(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and
unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterio-
ration; or
(v) actions of a similar nature.
(B) The term "routine governmental action" does not include any decision by a
foreign official whether, or on what terms, to award new business to or to con-
tinue business with a particular party, or any action taken by a foreign official in-
volved in the decision making process to encourage a decision to award new
business to or continue business with a particular party.76
The routine government actions exception appears to make the FCPA
more palatable than it would be without such a provision. It certainly
makes allowances for reasonable and relatively harmless payments. The
FCPA's definition of a routine government action does identify a few clear-
cut cases of activities that would be exempt from prosecution. If one needs
to pay a bribe that everyone else pays in a particular country to have one's
water hooked up, the statute is unambiguous, and the party making the




payment can feel secure that she won't be prosecuted.77 Likewise, busi-
nesspersons abroad who need reliable mail delivery needn't worry that a
small grease payment could lead to incarceration.78 This is certainly a good
thing.
The statute is far less helpful in the cases that are likely to be the most
compelling ones-those in which the ethical dilemmas for executives and
other businesspersons are more demanding and challenging. Arguably,
these areas in which the need for guidance is the strongest are also those in
which the statute is most deficient. Statutory reticence is exacerbated by
judicial reticence-to date, no court decisions interpret the "routine gov-
ernment actions" exception.79 In light of this dearth of illumination, either
statutory or judicial, this discussion addresses some of the reasons why the
routine government actions exemption is flawed.
Here's the most serious problem: some payments that are ethically jus-
tifiable, or even desirable, may be illegal or ambiguous under the statutory
language. In Section II, I introduced a hypothetical in which an entrenched
government was blocking food deliveries during a civil war, and in which
certain officials were proposing to facilitate delivery, sub rosa, provided
they were paid personal kickbacks.80 I also identified ethical analysis under
which payment of a bribe could be determined the right thing to do. Yet
under the language of the FCPA, the payment may be actionable. As we
shall see, the word "routine" is highly ambiguous, and payment in this hy-
pothetical isn't routine under the most plausible interpretations of that word.
One possible interpretation of "routine" is that it applies to frequent ac-
tions. Assume that the official in the hypothetical is not taking a bribe that
is commonly accepted in his country. To the contrary, given the goals of
the entrenched government to thwart the civil war by "starving out" the
communities of dissidents, it's likely that the acceptance of bribes to allow
food to pass the blockade is both dangerous and uncommon.
Another way to interpret "routine" is to mean "ordinary" or "common-
place." The list of goals for which routine payments can be made suggests
that this might be close to the intended meaning. The processing of gov-
ernment papers, the provision of police protection and mail services, the
provision of phone service and utilities, and the scheduling of inspections
are all enumerated in the statute,8 and are all ordinary, commonplace gov-
ernment activities. The statute also includes "loading and unloading cargo,
or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration.' 82
7 See supra note 76 and accompanying text78 See id.
79 See Gary Eisenberg, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 37 AM. CRim. L. REv. 595, 605
(2000).80 See supra Section I.
81 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
2 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f(3)(A)(ivX1999).
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These are also ordinary, commonplace activities, and they are likewise the
closest analogues to the situation in the hypothetical: payment to pass a
blockade. But are passage beyond a blockade and unloading cargo close
enough to assure decision-makers that the former will be protected from
prosecution?
Analogies are important here because of the layout of the statute. In
addition to the enumerated routine government actions, the statute permits
payments for "actions of a similar nature." This catch-all category requires
decision-makers contemplating the statute to think in terms of analogues.
On one hand, passage beyond a blockade and the unloading of cargo are
similar, in that both pertain to facilitation of the process of deliverance of
goods. If we think in these terms, and if we accept commonness and ordi-
nariness as the qualities of a "routine" government action, we may be
tempted to consider the payment permissible under the FCPA.
Before we get too comfortable with that assessment, consider yet an-
other way of interpreting the phrase "routine government action." "Rou-
tine" could incorporate an element of acceptance or legitimacy. These
certainly would be appealing qualities to attribute to the word "routine,"
given the general goal of distinguishing between legally permissible and le-
gally impermissible payments. If this is the case, then the lawful, com-
monly accepted unloading of cargo is routine, whereas the passage of a
government blockade in contravention of extant government edict is not.
The observations in this Section all lead to the same conclusion: It's
hard to imagine a less helpful phrase than the catch-all "actions of a similar
nature." Similarity and dissimilarity can be assessed on the basis of differ-
ent criteria. The statute doesn't even suggest the criterion for assessing
similarity-is it similarity of behavior? Similarity of ends? Similarity of
frequency? Similarity of commonality and ordinariness? Similarity of so-
cial or legal acceptance in the community? Moreover, similarity and dis-
similarity are obviously relative terms-terms that can be affected by
context, including cultural context. In truth, if a government action is not
specifically enumerated as exempt, the catch-all provides little help to a
prospective payer.
One final thought bears consideration. So far, this Section has ad-
dressed the idea that some payments not clearly permitted under the "rou-
tine government action" exception may in fact be desirable. Some suggest
the opposite problem: that payment for routine government actions ex-
empted under the FCPA is a bad thing. These commentators suggest that
grease payments are not harmless. According to McCary, "[a]lthough
greasing payments are considered to be acceptable in certain foreign lo-
cales, the international community has recently expressed a consensus that
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such payments constitute bribery.,13 If the logistical and moral distinctions
between corruption and grease become sufficiently blurred in international
communities, the perceived legitimacy of the grease payment exemption
may well decline. In this event, global acceptance of extraterritorial bribery
legislation could become more questionable than it already is. 4
IV. CAN CORPORATE PRINCIPLES EFFECTIVELY BATTLE
CORRUPTION?
Government programs to halt corruption have had limited success.85
Moreover, extraterritorial government edicts can engender resentment and
hostility.86 Exercise of authority across borders can evoke perceptions of
cultural imperialism and aggression, and therefore is potentially more trou-
blesome than domestic exercise of authority."
As large, centralized, highly bureaucratized entities, governments are
prone to other limitations. Perhaps most importantly, it is unlikely that such
enormous, impersonal institutions can effect significant changes in the val-
ues, beliefs, and mores of the individuals who ultimately must determine
whether bribery will flourish or dwindle. As Fort and Noone have noted,




. McCary, Bridging Ethical Borders: International Legal Ethics with an Islamic Per-
spective, 35 TEx. INT"L L.J. 289, 314 (2000).
84 For one article critical of the present global anti-bribery environment, see Balakrishnan
Rajagopal, Corruption, Legitimacy, and Human Rights: The Dialectic of the Relationship, 14
CoNNt. J. INT'L L. 495, 496 (1999) (referring to the current anti-corruption discourse as "re-
legitimating particular conceptions of development, rule of lawv, democracy and human
rights that are elitist, statist and Eurocentric"). For an article acknowledging the existence of
criticism of some current anti-corruption policies, see Barbara Crutchfield George et al., On
the Threshold of the Adoption of Global Antibribery Legislation: A Critical Analysis of Cur-
rent Domestic and International Efforts Toward the Reduction of Business Corruption, 32
VAI'D. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 19 (1999) (noting some who criticize U.S. promotion of the
FCPA abroad, and who contend that the U.S. is morally imperialistic).85 See Mary Jane Sheffet, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988: Did They Change Corporate Behavior?, 14 J. PUn. POL'Y &
MKTG. 290, 294-300 (1995) (observing that many companies have done nothing to respond
to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act); Transparency International, 1999 Bribe Payers Index,
1999 Corruption Perceptions Index, available at http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/
index.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2000) (revealing that after nearly 25 years under the FCPA,
the U.S. ranks an unimpressive 9 out of 19 on the dimension of corporate "propensity to
bribe senior officials").86 See V. Rock Grundman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application of
United States Law, 14 INT'L LAW. 257, 257 (1980) (suggesting that others resent the exporta-
tion of United States law).
8 See supra notes 5-6.
88 See Timothy L. Fort & James J. Noone, Challenges to Corporate Governance: Banded
Contracts, Mediating Institutions, and Corporate Governance: A Naturalist Analysis of Con-
tractual Theories of the Firm, 62 LAW & CONTENP. PROBS. 163, 196 (1999) ("[It] is not just
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These limitations of government suggest that we may need to consider
shifting our purview in the war against global corruption. One of the criti-
cal questions in this regard is whether corporations have a greater potential
than is generally recognized for creating sustainable reforms in the area of
transnational bribery. More specifically, do corporations have the ability to
effect meaningful changes in values, where nations will fail? Fort's work
on mediating institutions8 9 suggests that the answer to this question may be
yes. He notes,
Mediating institutions are relatively small communities which socialize individu-
als. They stand between the individual and the large megastructures of society,
such as the nation-state or the multinational corporation. Because of their small
size, mediating institutions allow individuals to see and experience the conse-
quences of their actions. Accordingly, those consequences teach moral norms
because they socialize individuals to see that their self-interest is connected with
the welfare of others.9°
Smaller corporations certainly fit Fort's description of mediating insti-
tutions capable of effecting modifications in value systems. Of course, cor-
porations of all sizes are not immune from potential charges of moral
imperialism, but they are less susceptible to such charges than governments.
Government is the classic imperial entity. Literal "empires" such as the his-
toric British Empire are built by governments, not by companies. More-
over, governments by their nature create laws, which by definition are
coercive. In contrast, corporate codes, rules, and guidelines are applied far
less expansively, because corporate communities have much smaller popu-
lations than government constituencies. Moreover, the potential imperialist
weight of government is supported by criminal laws, which carry the seri-
ous and therefore highly coercive threat of incarceration. While corporate
codes can have a powerful effect, their influence is largely limited by less
compelling sanctions-internal controls and penalties. One can be de-
moted, fined, or dismissed for violating a corporate code; one can't be im-
prisoned for such violation in absence of an overlapping, governmentally
sanctioned law. These inherent differences in size and coercive power ren-
der corporate efforts less threatening than their governmental counterparts,
when the efforts affect actions that take place across international borders.
any community that fosters the desire to be ethical, but a small one-a mediating institution.
In such a mediating institution, contracts are not based on consent alone, but have a social-
ized content-a banded contract").
89 See, e.g., Timothy L. Fort, The Corporation as Mediating Institution: An Efficacious
Synthesis of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NoTRE DAME L.
REV. 173 (1997); Timothy L. Fort, Business as Mediating Institution, 6 Bus. ETUcs Q. 149
(1996).
90 See Timothy L. Fort, The First Man and the Company Man: The Common Good, Tran-
scendence, and Mediating Institutions, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 391, 395 (1999) (citations omitted).
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The potential of mediating institutions in this area raises two important
questions: (1) Can corporate codes, guidelines, or principles be desirable
tools for curbing international bribery; and (2) If the answer to the first
question is yes, how effective will extant approaches be in achieving this
end?
A. Can Corporate Codes, Guidelines, or Principles be Desirable Tools for
Curbing International Bribery?
In earlier writings, I have suggested that we need to be careful in de-
veloping and implementing corporate codes. 9' This work distinguishes
"codes of law" from "codes of ethics." 92 Where there is widely held con-
sensus regarding right and wrong, legalistic codes (broadly classified as
"codes of law") can be an effective means of policing behavior.93 However,
in regard to legitimately controversial ethical situations-scenarios in
which reasonable minds can and do differ-codes are less defensible for
two reasons. They coerce people to behave in ways that may go against
their personal beliefs, and they belittle the idea of ethics by suggesting that
ethics are to be pre-cut by the corporate tailor in complex situations, and
then worn off the rack by mindless employees.94
These generalizations apply to codes regarding bribery, just as they
would apply to generic ethical codes, or to codes focused on meeting other
particular ethical challenges. If principles are supported by virtually uni-
versal consensus, they have the potential to become effective organizational
laws. If they attempt to manipulate behavior in areas where legitimate con-
troversy exists, they are likely to be dysfunctional or even counter-
productive, undermining the legitimate exercise of personal ethical judg-
ment.
In one sense, bribery and corruption are subject to a universal consen-
sus; in another sense, they are not. The consensus exists on the broader
level. Even in nations where abuses are rampant or supported by a benefit-
ing power elite, the institution of bribery is not approved by the population
at large.95 As Nichols notes, "the concept of bribery is universally con-
demned. ', 96 This conceptual condemnation of bribery is a logical extension
91 See infra notes 92-94.
92 See Steven R. Salbu, Law and Conformity, Ethics and Conflict: The Trouble with Law-
Based Conceptions ofEthics, 68 IND. L.J. 101, 103-07 (1992).
93 See id. at 104-05.94 See Steven R. Salbu, True Codes Versus Voluntary Codes of Ethics in International
Markets: Towards the Preservation of Colloquy in Emerging Global Communities, 15 U. PA.
J. INT'L Bus. L. 327 (1994).95 See Mark J. Murphy, International Bribery: An Example of an Unfair Trade Practice?,
21 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 385, 392 (1995) ("[B]ribery is generally not condoned-at least
once it is publicly revealed").96 See Nichols, Increasing Global Security, supra note 7, at 476.
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of a more general honesty norm. At a more particularized level, however,
"the precise boundaries of what constitutes a bribe may differ."98 The con-
sensus regarding bribery is conceptual; the differences across cultures exist
when the concept is translated and applied to specific behaviors.
Under these conditions, corporate principles condemning bribery are
most likely to succeed if they are conceptually snug, yet still leave breath-
ing room for cultural differences at the stage of application. This is a diffi-
cult razor's edge to navigate, because it demands two qualities that tend to
be at odds-it asks a code to be both tight and loose at the same time. If
corporate principles are to be effective while respecting legitimate cultural
differences, just such a subtle balance is required. The following Subsection
assesses two contemporary efforts to create corporate codes, guidelines, or
principles.
B. How Effective Will Extant Approaches be at Stemming Bribery
Through Codes, Guidelines, or Principles?
This Subsection looks at two contemporary efforts to create codes,
guidelines or principles that can be applied by mediating institutions to fight
corruption at the organizational level-International Chamber of Commerce
Corporate Practices Criteria, and Hess and Dunfee's C2 Principles.
1. International Chamber of Commerce Corporate Practices Criteria.
Formal codes and principles are not the only offerings available to help
guide corporate behavior. Less formal recommendations and guidelines
also exist, purporting to help companies navigate the legal and ethical
shoals of bribery and corruption.
Consider the sometimes subtle distinction between gifts and bribes, a
distinction that can be especially complex in transnational contexts, where
important differences may exist in etiquette, values, and norms.99 A recent
International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") Corporate Practices Manual
reports three criteria that one company uses to differentiate between bribes
and good-faith gifts:
a. Bribes are made in secret, while gifts are made openly as gestures of good-
will or affection.
b. Bribes are often made through intermediaries, while gifts are usually made
directly.
97 For discussion of anti-bribery norms as they relate to honesty norms, see Claire Moore
Dickerson, Political Corruption: Free-Flowing Opportunism, 14 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 393, 394-
96 (1999).
98 See Nichols, Increasing Global Security, supra note 7, at 467 n.96.
99 See Salbu, Premature Evocation, supra note 3.
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c. Bribes create obligations on the part of recipients, while gifts come with no
such conditions.10
As well-intentioned as such guidelines are, their usefulness is ques-
tionable, and they could do more harm than good. First, they are generali-
zations concerning correlation, rather than principled guidelines for making
legitimate distinctions. As such, they probably aren't the worst correla-
tional stereotypes-it makes sense that bribes are disproportionately furtive,
and that they often are laundered, and tracks often are hidden, by the circui-
tous use of intermediaries. But like all stereotypes, these are likely to evoke
plenty of errors as well. Bribes can be paid without secrecy; legitimate
payments can be paid furtively for legitimate reasons, such as the avoidance
of publicity in order to keep strategies confidential.
Some of the generalizations don't make sense-for example, the
statement that gifts generally are not given through intermediaries. On
what basis is this stereotype put forward? Indeed, instances where the
FCPA is most likely to be evoked are also those where intermediaries are
most likely to be needed or used for legitimate gift-giving. If a U.S. com-
pany does business in China, high-level executives located in the U.S. are
very likely to send gifts through intermediaries, be they friends or acquaint-
ances who are otherwise doing business in China, or local contacts who are
on site and also have expertise regarding appropriate and suitable gifts. Use
of intermediaries may have to do with illicit motives; it also may reflect
nothing more culpable than the practical necessity of using others to tender
legitimate gifts halfway around the world.
Finally, the idea that bribes create recipient obligations, while gifts do
not, is overly simplistic. It ignores the fact that reciprocity norms are strong
even in regard to legitimate gift-giving.'0' Consider the couple that is plan-
ning a dinner party and decides to invite the Joneses, stating, '"We owe
them." While there are no strong express notions of reciprocal obligation
attached to dinner parties, there are strong implicit notions of reciprocity.
These kinds of expectations hardly trigger concerns about corruption. This
is murky territory at its cloudiest. The idea that items of value can be neatly
categorized into obligation-triggering and non obligation-triggering catego-
ries is overly simplistic.
100 See Frank Reynolds, Export ABCs: Autumn Required Reading, J. COM., Sept. 11,
2000, at Special Report 3 WP, available at http://wvv.joc.com (last visited Feb. 10, 2000)
(reporting that the International Chamber of Commerce Corporate Practice's Manual offers
these three suggestions as "practical suggestions for companies wishing to develop anti-
bribery policies").
101 Consider gift-giving in Japanese business contexts. Like any gift-giving situation, it
can be blatantly corrupt. However, gift-giving also can be a legitimate display of Japanese
etiquette and protocol. Nonetheless, even under the most benign conditions, one commenta-
tor notes that gift-giving in Japanese business contexts "almost always" evokes reciprocity
expectations. See Jonathan Watts, Sleaze Seeps Out of Gift-Wrapping, GuARDIoa' (London),
Dec. 23, 1996, at 8 (citing comments of Masao Miyamoto).
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For these reasons, the kinds of corporate guidelines that are likely to
work best are carefully considered, principled guidelines. Generalizations,
tips, and hints are likely to be more risky and less helpful. Grounded in fre-
quently inaccurate stereotypes, they will create error. That error will be
greater or lesser according to the degree that the underlying stereotypes are
unreliable.
2. Hess and Dunfee's C2 Principles.
Hess and Dunfee have provided another model for the corporate re-
form approach, 10 2 one that is more formal than that discussed in the ICC
Corporate Practices Manual. Hess and Dunfee's approach is patterned after
the Sullivan Principles that many companies adopted in response to apart-
heid in South Africa, 103 and the McBride Principles that applied to conduct
of operations in troubled Northern Ireland. 1°4 The authors cite precedent for
the application of corporate principles in other areas of social responsibility
as well-the CERES Principles, or Valdez Principles, applied to environ-
mental issues;0 5 the Slepak principles, applied to human rights issues in the
Soviet Union;10 6 and the Miller Principles, applied to doing business in the
People's Republic of China and Tibet.07
Hess and Dunfee's principles for bribery and corruption are called the
"C2 Principles" ("Principles"), an acronym for "combating corruption."' 108
The philosophy of the C2 Principles is to "require firms to implement pro-
cedures to prevent the payment of bribes and to publicly disclose their pro-
gress and efforts towards these ends."' 0 9 Specifically, a corporation that
endorses the C2 Principles makes the following pledges:
1. To disclose publicly and make widely known its endorsement of the C2
Principles.
2. To establish a clearly articulated written policy against the payment of
bribes and "kickbacks" by the firm's employees.
3. To implement the policy with due care and take appropriate disciplinary
action against any employee discovered to have made payments in violation of
the policy.
102 David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled Approach: The
C2Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 593 (2000).
103 For discussion of the Sullivan Principles, see Alexandra Bemasek & Richard C. Por-
ter, Private Pressure for Social Change in South Africa: The Impact of the Sullivan Princi-
ples, 55 REv. Soc. EcoN. 172 (1997).
104 For discussion of the McBride Principles, see Kevin A. Burke, Fair Employment in
Northern Ireland: The Role ofAffirmative Action, 28 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1 (1994).
105 Hess andDunfee, supra note 102, at 626 & n.141.
'
0
'Id. at 626 & n.142.
107 id.
' Id. at 615.09Id. at 594.
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4. To provide training for employees to carry out the policy, and to provide
continuing support, such as help lines, to assist employees to act in compliance
with the firm's policy.
5. To record all transactions fully and fairly, in accordance with clearly stated
record keeping procedures and accounting controls, and conduct internal audits
to assure no improper payments are made.
6. To report annually on the firm's bribery and corruption policy along with a
description of the firm's experience implementing and enforcing the policy.
7. To have the annual report in principle audited either by an independent fi-
nancial auditor or by an independent social auditor, or both.
8. To require all agents of the finn to affirm that they have neither made nor
will make any improper payments in any business venture or contract to which
the firm is a party.
9. To require all suppliers of the firm to affirm that they have neither made
nor will make any improper payments in any business venture or contract to
which the firm is a party.
10. To establish a monitoring and auditing system to detect any improper
payments made by the firm's employees and agents.
11. To report publicly any solicitations for payments (or report privately to a
monitoring organization or a social auditor).
12. To establish a system to allow any employee or agent of the firm to report
any improper payment without fear of retribution for their disclosures. 110
The C2 Principles contain provisions that attack corruption in two dis-
tinct ways: by prohibiting corrupt behaviors' and by ensuring appropriate
monitoring, record-keeping, and reporting functions that encourage trans-
parency."' In this sense, the Principles resemble the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act's dual-tiered approach13
The discussion in this Subsection focuses on the prohibition of corrupt
behavior contained primarily in Principle 2, rather than on the monitoring,
record-keeping, and reporting provisions. It bears noting at this point, how-
ever, that the latter provisions are highly detailed and specific. This is ap-
propriate for audit-related provisions, because the audit and control
processes of a company are essentially legalistic rather than ethical in na-
ture. While they certainly support ethical behavior, in and of themselves
they are administrative. As such, they benefit from detail that reflects seri-
ous thought on optimization of administrative functions. The audit-related
provisions provide more rather than less guidance to employees who are
"°Id. at 626.
"' See Principle 2, text accompanying supra note 110.
12 See Principles 5-12, text accompanying supra note 110.
1 3 The FCPA contains both anti-bribery provisions and record-keeping provisions. For
the anti-bribery provisions, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3 (1999). For the record
keeping provisions, see 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (1994).
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implementing a system of administrative controls. This specificity should
add to the effectiveness of the audit system and consistency of its opera-
tions. Since the audit system supports ethical behavior and is not in itself
an ethics provision, high specification doesn't run the risk of taking respon-
sible decision-making authority from corporate actors facing difficult ethi-
cal questions under conditions of subtle cultural heterogeneity.
The anti-corruption provisions in the Principles are very different from
the audit-related provisions, in that they are broad, and are not closely fo-
cused on highly specified behaviors. The C2 anti-corruption Principles
avoid the main shortcoming of the ICC Corporate Practices-the reliance
on stereotypes to provide guidance to decision-makers. This difference
may be related to a broader difference in the two efforts-whereas the ICC
approach seems to aim for extreme simplicity, and therefore ease of appli-
cation, the C2 anticorruption Principles are more open-textured and theo-
retical. If the ICC approach were less prone to errors in stereotyping, it
would have a strong advantage over the C2 anti-corruption Principles in
providing relatively clear, easily applied guidance. Unfortunately, while the
goal of easy answers is attractive, it may be untenable because easy answers
do not exist for difficult questions.
The C2 anti-corruption Principles appear neither to seek nor to provide
simplistic guidance. Rather, the primary strength of the C2 anti-corruption
Principles is their grounding in theory rather than in easy behavioral an-
swers or suggestions. This quality makes them inherently more difficult to
apply than the ICC tips, in that a decision-maker must engage in more
elaborate thought processes and assessments. For example, Principle 2
doesn't define a "bribe" or "kickback," and Principle 8 doesn't define an
"improper payment." The decision-maker is left to distinguish legitimate
consideration or gifts from corrupt offerings, in the context of local or re-
gional differences in protocol and custom. This process can and likely will
incorporate assessments that take cultural heterogeneity into account.'
14
What are the main advantages to this approach? By virtue of their lack
of specificity, the anti-corruption Principles leave breathing room for deci-
sion-makers to exercise responsible ethical judgment. In the process, the
Principles avoid blind adherence to overly specific requirements that would
allow no consideration of the local definitional and implementation differ-
ences noted in the immediately preceding paragraphs. In contrast, the Prin-
ciples are tighter and more highly specified where they ought to be-in the
more legalistic, administrative audit provisions.
14 Recall that there appears to be a universal conceptual condemnation of bribery, but
less universal agreement on what specifically comprises a bribe at the margins. See supra
notes 96, 98, and accompanying text. It is important to emphasize here that the C2 Princi-
ples' open texture leaves room for exercise of decision-maker discretion at the definitional
and implementation stages only. They do not permit a decision-maker whose employer has
adopted the Principles to decide that bribery is acceptable in a particular culture.
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The result is a set of model requirements through which corporations
can achieve some real results. The Principles set a clear and unambiguous
tone. If they expect the Principles to work, corporate leaders must adopt
them seriously and in good faith, and not simply as window dressing. If
leaders effectively communicate the seriousness of their commitment, no
lower-level worker need experience corporate ambiguity on the issue of
bribery. The company that seriously adopts the Principles and puts its
weight behind them sends decision-makers clear signals in bidding for
business: the company will not condone the payment of bribes, and workers
will not be penalized for loss of business attributable to refusing to violate
the principles.
Perhaps most importantly, the tightly designed audit provisions provide
transparency and meaningful controls, while the loosely designed prohibi-
tions allow human decision-makers to exercise their best judgment in ways
that respect cultural heterogeneity and legitimate, subtle differences in de-
fining corruption. For this reason, the Principles can avert the risk of impe-
rialism inherent in extraterritorial legislative approaches, such as the present
efforts to spread FCPA-style statutes across the globe.
V. SHOULD NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SUPPLANT
GOVERNMENT ACTION IN THE WAR AGAINST GLOBAL
CORRUPTION?
In past articles, I have questioned the wisdom of globalizing the U.S.
approach to fighting corruption. My specific concerns about the FCPA
have focused on its ineffectiveness and inefficiency,1 5 as well as possible
cultural imperialism n1 6 and global discord.117 All of these articles have sug-
gested that we look for alternative solutions to the recent "paradigm
shift"11' toward FCPA multilateralization-a shift most notable in the form
of accords like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment ("OECD") Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi-
cials in International Business Transactions, 9 and the Organization of
American States ("OAS") Inter-American Convention Against Corrup-
tion.1 20 While commentators tend to applaud these conventions as reflec-
115 See generally Salbu, Delicate Balance, supra note 4; Salbu, Information Technology,
supra note 4.
1 6 See generally Salbu, Premature Evocation, supra note 3.117 See generally Salbu, Threat to Global Harmony, supra note 3.
18 See Nii Lante Wallace-Brace, Corruption and Competitiveness in Global Business-
The Dawn of a New Era, 24 MELB. U. L. REv. 349, 362-66 (2000).
19 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Busi-
ness Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1, available at http://vwwv.oecd.org/daf/noc orru
ption/20novl e.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2000).
120 Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724, avail-
able at http://www.oas.org (last visited Nov. 25, 2000).
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tions of a growing global accord in the war against corruption, 121 others
challenge this depiction. 122 They portray a reluctant resignation on the part
of some signatory nations that may have been hectored and politically ma-
neuvered into compliance.'2 3 To the extent that participation is coerced, we
have reason to wonder if implementing legislation, not to mention enforce-
ment of implementing legislation, will ever be realized.
In other earlier articles, I have suggested that reform of social institu-
tions that undergird corruption is a more promising approach than multilat-
eral extraterritorial legislation. 124 While there are many such institutional
foundations of corruption that we can attack, my research has focused on a
few particular ones, such as poverty and underpayment of public officials
125
and the global digital divide. 26
These previous writings have not addressed a very important question:
should non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") supplant governmental
organizations in the international battle against corruption? In other words,
should incipient multilateral extraterritorial laws, mimicking the U.S. For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act, be replaced by NGO initiatives?
The NGOs that most typically come up in discussions about global cor-
ruption are Transparency International ("TI"),' 27 the International Monetary
121 See, e.g., Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International Law, 10
DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 345, 410 (2000) ("Notwithstanding. .. concerns, the OECD Con-
vention is a relevant step in the development of the treatment of bribery under international
law. Leaving aside for the moment its substantive developments and the questions raised
about its implementation and enforcement, this Article submits that its contribution to the
development of a common language and definitions in this field is highly relevant in itself.
In addition, the OECD Convention may grow in membership and eventually become the
model upon which is built a more comprehensive and balanced regime").
.
22 See, e.g., Brian Michael Jenkins, Commentary, Oil Greases the Way for Corruption,
L.A. TImEs, Oct. 31, 2000, at B9, available at http://wwv.latimes.com (last visited Feb. 10,
2001).
123 See id. ("The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development's convention
against bribery in 1999 globalized the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and represented a vic-
tory for the proponents of ethical business practices. The agreement, however, does not re-
flect consensus. Many factors persuaded governments to go along. Principles played a role,
but domestic politics drove decisions. For European and Asian governments, the reasons for
supporting the convention varied. In addition to being persuaded that it was a good thing to
do, they faced hectoring by the Americans and more gentle but effective persuasion by the
International Chamber of Commerce and World Economic Forum").
124 See Salbu, Battling Global Corruption, supra note 4; Salbu, Information Technology,
supra note 4.
125 See generally Salbu, Battling Global Corruption, supra note 4.
126 See generally Salbu, Information Technology, supra note 4.
127 See, e.g., A Guide to Graft, EcoNoMisT, Oct. 30, 1999, at 86 (discussing Transparency
International in regard to the escalating global war against corruption, and suggesting the
group's influence by observing that no country can ignore it).
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Fund ("IMF"), 128 the World Bank,I29 and the United Nations. 3° Among
these, Transparency International is the organization most specifically fo-
cused on the problem of transnational corruption. For the other organiza-
tions, corruption is one of many concerns. This may explain why TI really
plays the leading role among NGOs in this arena. In addition, TI has not
been plagued by the degree of criticism that has recently dogged the IMF
and the World Bank.
131
The idea that an NGO like Transparency International could supplant
rather than supplement governmental action is certainly novel. TI's litera-
ture consistently supports contemporary multilateralization of FCPA-style
legislation, 32 and a potential government-substitute role is one that TI itself
has never endorsed for itself. Yet the notion of NGOs taking on more ag-
gressive quasi-governmental functions is gaining ground in international-
ized contexts, 133 and with good reason. NGOs can serve as neutral
institutions that are ideally positioned to act quickly and to overcome paro-
chial sovereign interests of government.
12 8 See Miguel Diaz, Lenders are Leaning on Governments to Clean Up Corruption,
LATIN FinANCE, Sept. 2000, at 54 (noting the growing role of the var against corruption in
the IMF's lending policies).
129 See Kenneth R. Timmerman, Q: Is the World Bank Still Needed in Today's Global
Economy?; No: Stop the Flow of Taxpayer Funds that Prop Up Many Corrupt Third World
Regimes, INSIGHT ON THE NEws, May 22, 2000, at 41 ("[T]he World Bank now sees its mis-
sion as alleviating poverty and fighting corruption in developing nations").
130 See, e.g., Barbara Crutchfield George et al., The 1998 OECD Convention: An Impetus
for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes toward Corruption in Business Transactions, 37 AM.
Bus. L.J. 485, 522 (2000) (referring to United Nations General Assembly Resolution: Action
Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions); Press Release,
Transparency International, United Nations Issues Landmark Declaration Against Corrup-
tion (Dec. 18, 1996), available at http:/wwv.transparency.de/documentspressrelea
ses/1996/1996.12.18.un.html (announcing the United Nations' issuance of its "Declaration
Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions").
'31 For a discussion of this criticism, see Reforms Needed to Restore JAF Credibility,
TORONTO STAR, Oct. 26,2000, at BU02; Doug Henwood, Stiglitz and the Limits of 'Reform':
The Recent Departures of the World Bank's Chief Economist and an Expert He Brought
Makes it Clear That the 'Washington Consensus' Still Rules, NATION, Oct. 2,2000, at 20.
132 See, e.g., Transparency International Programs and Activities, available at
http://vvww.transparency.de/activities/index.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2000) ("We vork to
ensure that the agendas of international organizations give high priority to curbing corrup-
tion. We are promoting new inter-governmental agreements to fight corruption in an inter-
nationally co-ordinated manner. Both the TI Secretariat and TI National Chapters around the
world actively monitor the implementation of such agreements by the signatory countries.
This includes monitoring of Conventions included within the framework of the OECD, the
Council of Europe, the European Union and the Organization of American States. Special
emphasis is on monitoring the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials").
3 For a more detailed discussion of this function of NGOs, see C. David Lee, Legal Re-
form in China: A Role for Nongovernmental Organizations, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 363 (2000).
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There is recent precedent for serious, authoritative, quasi-governmental
roles among NGOs in modem global society. Consider in particular the
role that the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
("ICANN") is taking in the arena of Internet domain name policy.134 The
remainder of this Section describes the development of this model for NGO
assumption of quasi-governmental functions. The intent is to demonstrate
the potential of NGOs in this arena, in order to open discussion among
scholars regarding a possible analogous enhanced NGO application in the
war against bribery and corruption.
Created in October of 1998, ICANN has been ceded governmental au-
thority to administer dispute resolution, which it does under the Uniform
Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy.135 Specifically, ICANN is a not-
for-profit organization that oversees the distribution of domain names and
the resolution of domain-name disputes. 136 Although ICANN itself is en-
tirely private, it was created at the behest of the U.S. Commerce Depart-
ment, largely in response to concerns over the role and functions of
Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"). 3 7 In particular, critics were concerned
about NSI's government-sanctioned monopoly over in the domain name
registration market, as well as NSI's purported lack of a policy for the reso-
lution of domain name disputes.
138
For a non-governmental entity, ICANN's Board maintains an impres-
sive amount of power and influence, in regard to both individual-level deci-
sions and the establishment of broad public policy. 39 For example, in
managing the creation of new top-level domains ("TLDs"), ICANN re-
cently created rules and procedures that resemble traditionally governmen-
tal administrative processes:
The Board unanimously adopted the roll out of new TLDs in a measured and re-
sponsible manner as recommended by the Names Council, and will issue a for-
mal call for applications by those seeking to sponsor or operate a new TLD as of
August 1, 2000, with a roll out expected as early as the beginning of next year.
13 See Gordian Knotwork: What's in a Name? On the Internet, at Least, the Answer is
Technology, Politics, Money and Ego, ECONOMIST, July 31, 1999, at 58 (discussing the high
stakes in which ICANN was given an enormous interest upon its creation).
135 See Monica B. Richman, Update: Five Recent Domain Name Cases Raise Novel Is-
sues ofFirst Impression, E-CoMMERCE, Sept. 2000, at 8.
136 See Claire Barliant, Rough Justice, AM. LAw, Sept. 2000, at 71 (discussing the roles
and responsibilities of ICANN).
137 See Luke A. Walker, ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 289, 294-95 (2000).
138 See id. The monopoly has since been dismantled, and others now compete with NSI
in the domain name registration market.
139 Indeed, ICANN's enormous power has generated criticism. See Mike France, What's
in a Name.com? Plenty: A Brawl Over Net Names Could Threaten Web Self-Governance,
Bus. WK., Sept 6, 1999, at 86 (noting two criticisms of ICANN-its alleged secret opera-
tions and its alleged usurpation of an excessive amount of power).
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According to ICANN, proposed operators must provide the following in addition
to the U.S. $ 50,000 non-refundable application fee: (1) full information about
their technical, business, management, and financial capabilities, (2) detailed de-
scription of the policies contemplated to promote orderly registration of names in
the initial phases of introduction of the TLD, (3) full details concerning arrange-
ments proposed to protect user in the event of failure, and (4) measures proposed
for minimizing use of the TLD to carry out infringements or other abuse of intel-
lectual property rights.
140
Moreover, ICANN provides guidelines for the implementation of it
procedures, and these guidelines resemble administrative guidelines of clas-
sic governmental regulatory processes:
The Board provide[s] guidelines that it will consider in assessing applications,
which include the need to maintain the Internet's stability, the enhancement of
competition for registration and the utility of the DNS, and the importance of ap-
propriate protections of rights of others, including intellectual property right, in
connection with the operation of the TLD, especially during the start-up phases.
The Board will consider all types of TLDs including fully open, restricted and
chartered with limited scope, noncommercial, and personal. While some in the
Internet community felt the Board's resolution was somewhat vague, the bot-
toms-up consensus building process of ICANN did not produce a consensus on
the specific type of TLD or the model under which they should be added.
141
Finally, ICANN serves a quasi-governmental accrediting function, as it
accredits alternative dispute resolution providers for the arbitration of Inter-
net domain name disputes. 42
Despite its tremendous governance power, 143 everything about ICANN
is nongovernmental in nature. It is a non-governmental entity, and it is ad-
vised largely by non-governmental experts on Domain Name System policy
issues-i.e., by the "Names Council," whose members are experts in e-
commerce, intellectual property, and technology.
144
While ICANN is an NGO created by and in the United States, there
can be no doubt that its impact will be enormous around the world. This is
largely because, while "dot-corn" top-level domain names are a U.S. crea-
,
40 See Caroline G. Chicoine, Summary of ICANN Yokohama Meeting, INTELL. PROP.
TODAY, Sept. 2000, at 37.
141 See id.
14 2 See Developments in the Law- The Paths of Civil Litigation (pt. VI), 113 HARv. L.
REv. 1851, 1856 n.39 (2000).
"'See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from
Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. Rav. 395, 485 (2000) ("ICANN's future power
should not be underestimated. No one can establish a publicly accessible web site without
an Internet domain name. Accordingly, if ICANN should decide that domain name registrars
may (or must) deny registration unless the applicant forswears certain sorts of expression,
meets specified criteria of 'good standing,' or pays a substantial fee, then those who fail to
do so will effectively have no presence on the web").
144 See Chicoine, supra note 140, at 37.
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tion under U.S. control, they are also a global elite standard for e-commerce
entities. 14  Moreover, controversies over domain name rights and infringe-
ments are going to be enormously global and complex by their very nature,
as the same second-level and third-level domain names are registered under
an increasingly wide range of TLD names. ICANN's role as a global arbi-
ter is guaranteed by virtue of these phenomena; this prospective role could
also prove desirable, given the world's need for an integrated, inclusive pol-
icy in this area of law.
The precedent established by ICANN tells us that NGOs can play an
increasingly substantial role in global regulation. This role is likely to con-
tinue to grow, in an increasingly wider range of sectors, as all worldwide
activity becomes more and more globally interdependent. The questions
that remain are whether ICANN's NGO-governance precedent makes
sense, 146 and whether there are good reasons to expand the notion to areas
such as corruption control. While this Perspective doesn't attempt to an-
swer these questions, the remainder of this Section identifies some of the
advantages that can be gained by a growing NGO role in this and other ar-
eas of international governance.
What ICANN represents is an expansive governance role accorded to a
non-governmental entity.147 The fact that ICANN plays this role in an un-
precedented way148 is probably not a coincidence. Because it is a quickly
145 See Christopher P. Rains, A Domain Name by Any Other Name: Forging International
Solutions for the Governance of Internet Domain Names, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 355, 369
("[R]egistration of TLDs as '.com,' in widespread use by parties in many nations, is dele-
gated to a United States organization alone (and a private sector organization, at that)").
146 For one vocal vote of "no," see A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace:
Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DuKE L.J. 17, 29 (2000)
("There is a danger, however, that ICANN may not be unique for long. One administration
spokesperson has already suggested that ICANN should be a model for regulation of other
Internet-related issues such as accreditation standards for distance learning and e-commerce
over business-to-business 'closed' networks. The specter of a series of ICANN clones in the
United States or in cyberspace should give one pause, because ICANN is a very bad model,
one that undermines the procedural values that motivate both the APA and the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution. DoC's reliance on ICANN has (1) reduced public participation in
decision making over public issues, (2) vested key decision making power in an essentially
unaccountable private body that many feel has already abused its authority in at least small
ways and is indisputably capable of abusing it in big ways, and (3) nearly (but, as argued be-
low, not quite) eliminated the possibilities for judicial review of critical decisions regarding
the DNS. So far, ICANN appears to be accountable to no one except DoC itself, a depart-
ment with a strong vested interest in declaring its DNS 'privatization' policy to be a suc-
cess").
147 See Developments in the Law- The Law of Cyberspace (pt. V), 112 HARv. L. RFv.
1657, 1675 (1999) (referring to ICANN as a "powerful corporation embarking on a world-
wide mission").
148 See Derek Scally, New Moves in the Name Game: There are Changes Afoot at the Or-
ganization Which Assigns Domain Names, IRISH TnEs, Oct. 30, 2000, at 12 (referring to
ICANN's "unprecedented influence over the Intemet's future use and growth").
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developing global technology that defies borders, 149 the Internet magnifies
international governance challenges and increases their urgency. Domain
name registration and protection are an enormous concern that didn't exist
ten years ago.150 Like many Internet issues, domain name management is a
big challenge for which we have had little planning time.
Because interactive computer technology resists, ignores, and easily
surmounts international borders, Internet domain name protection chal-
lenges have been difficult to address either locally or domestically. Due the
need for global coordination, orderly domain name registration requires
immediate international standardization not easily accomplished by gov-
ernment sovereignty.
Traditional sovereign government may well lack the tools to face this
essential global standardization challenge, as regulatory procedures are no-
toriously slow and cumbersome-indeed, the phrase "government bureauc-
racy" has come to connote the essence of intolerable sluggishness.
ICANN's amazingly speedy accession of global power as an NGO is a
model for a new paradigm. It suggests that, when global interests fear iner-
tia and resistance in reform measures, coordination and orchestration of
change may be more readily achieved by NGOs than by government or-
ganizations.
The potential of NGOs in the arena of international change goes be-
yond their ability to circumvent inaction. Unlike governments, NGOs can
embody objectivity, if they are truly beholden to no one sovereignty over
another.15 1 In this capacity, an NGO bears several crucial advantages over
government-initiated reform. First, NGOs have the potential to garner
speedy transnational support without having to overcome the suspicion and
caution that can accompany sovereign initiatives. Second, NGOs can in-
corporate a variety of perspectives in a disinterested way, and this disinter-
estedness may result in superior policies as a result of openness to all
viewpoints. Third, NGOs can avoid cumbersome delays that result from
decentralization. Provided the world accepts ICANN's role, ICANN can
move quickly and efficiently as a single organization. Finally, if the NGO
is a legitimate organization with global support, its policies are automati-
149 See Karen Bevill, Copyright Infringement and Access: Has the Access Requirement
Lost Its Probative Value?, 52 RUTGERS L. Ruv. 311, 330 (1999) (discussing the borderless
nature of the Internet).
l'4 The Internet was not publicly available until the early to middle 1990s. Before this
time, few even knew what a domain name was.
151 This condition is not a given for NGOs, and indeed it is easy to imagine NGOs that
are formed at the instigation of particular governmental entities, and which therefore have
organizational loyalties and dependencies on one government over another. While some
NGOs certainly can be beholden to particular nations, NGOs have the potential to be neutral
in ways that governments never can replicate. The utility of NGOs as discussed in this Sec-
tion presumes that the organizations are created and funded in ways that avert dependency
on particular nations, as well as other potential conflicts of interest
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cally globally unified in a way that would be logistically difficult to repli-
cate among hundreds of nations in a heterogeneous world.
These are substantial advantages. Moreover, they are advantages that
may be well-suited to the challenges of controlling international corruption.
It is time for serious discussion and assessment of the NGO's potential to
supplant government regulation in the sphere of corruption control.
VI. CONCLUSION: CAN WORLD CULTURES CHANGE TO PLACE
DECREASING EMPHASIS ON PATRONAGE?
Future legal scholarship must address the direction of future global
convergence efforts. To foster a transnational conversation, and ultimately
a truer global accord, what topics of conversation are most promising? In
this Conclusion, I provide one example of an important subject for global
colloquy: reform of the system of patronage and the ethos of patrimony.
Like corruption itself,152 the values of reciprocity and patronage are deeply
embedded in some cultures,153 and therefore are promising targets for effec-
tive worldwide dialogue and reform efforts.
Patronage and patrimony are promising topics of global dialogue in
another sense-they are targets potentially reformed with greater effective-
ness and efficiency than other institutional targets, such as global poverty.
In an earlier article, I observed that grand-scale bribery is motivated by
greed rather than by need,154 so that what is arguably the worst form of cor-
ruption 55 is also that form least amenable to some of the most obvious sys-
temic reform efforts. Reducing poverty, for example, would not reduce
greed among higher-level officials who are seeking luxury rather than sub-
sistence in the form of substantial bribes. 56
Accordingly, amelioration of poverty and augmentation of public sec-
tor salaries should reduce petty bribery, and should do so efficiently, be-
cause it is a systemic change that benefits from systemic efficiencies.1
57
However, addressing poverty and salaries of officials is unlikely to affect
the more serious problem of grand bribery, which is not attributable to
152 See, e.g., Jane M. Picker & Sidney Picker, Jr., Educating Russia's Future Lawyers-
Any Role for the United States?, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 17, 25-26 n.34 (2000) (describ-
ing corruption as "endemic to Russian culture").
153 See, e.g., P. Steidlmeier, Gift Giving, Bribery and Corruption: Ethical Management of
Business Relationships in China, 20 J. Bus. ETmIcs 121 (1999) (calling reciprocity "a foun-
dational pillar of social intercourse" in China, where "[t]o approach another and bring noth-
ing is unusual," and "[t]o accept a gift and not reciprocate is perceived as morally wrong").
-
54 See generally Salbu, Delicate Balance, supra note 4.
155 See id. (arguing that grand bribery not only is quantitatively more destructive than
petty bribery, but also tends to be qualitatively more destructive, in that grand bribes often
yield more harmful or devastating concessions and results).
5 See id.
157 See generally Salbu, Information Technology, supra note 4.
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need. This means that poverty and salary solutions, while more efficient
than legislative alternatives, are unlikely to be effective against the most
devastating kinds of corruption.
In contrast, focusing the global conversation and global reforms on pa-
tronage and the ethos of patrimony is both efficient and effective against the
most harmful kinds of corruption-i.e., against grand bribery. Reinforcing
and elaborating Bosworth-Davies' contention that corruption is partially a
function of entrenched patronage and nepotism,'58 Theobald explains grand
corruption in terms of a "'patrimonial' ethos."' 59 Especially prevalent in
developing nations but also peripherally present in developed nations,
60
this mindset entails "an administrative apparatus which coheres around a
network of personal dependencies rather than objective administrative
structures, and in which there is no clear-cut separation between incumbent
and office, between public resources and private interests.''
This description contains two clues that may help nations to fashion
their own systemic reforms to fight global corruption. The first pertains to
the entrenchment of a patrimonial "network of personal dependencies," and
the second pertains to the absence of "objective administrative structures."
A critical question arises from these clues: how do we replace informal
socio-cultural networks-breeding grounds for abuses and aberrations
generally and nepotism specifically-with formalized administrative
structures, the rules, guidelines and policies of which reduce opportunities
for the abusive exercise of discretion?
This challenge is confounded by the fact that administrative structures
imposed to date have proven to be anything but objective. Mbaku discusses
state controls in Africa, intended to effect the kinds of reforms I have been
discussing. 62 Rather than ridding African society of poverty, deprivation,
and corruption, rigorous state control has "encouraged and advanced nepo-
tism, bureaucratic and political corruption, and constrained the development
of viable and sustainable economic governmental systems."'63 Mbaku at-
tributes the subversion of bureaucratic solutions to bad economic poli-
cies. 64 These include the nationalization of valuable resources, which
158 See Rowan Bosvorth-Davies, Corruption: The Prisoner's Dilemma, FmN. Tnmfis Bus.
REP., FRAUD REP., Nov. 1, 1997, at6.
... Robin Theobald, Lancing the Swollen African State: Will it Alleviate the Problem of
Corruption?, 32 J. MODERN AFRICAN STUD. 701,703 (1994).
160 See id. at 704.
161 See id. at 703.
162 See John Mukum Mbaku, Bureaucratic Corruption and Policy Reform in Africa, 19 J.
Soc., POL. & ECON. STUD. 149 (1994).
163 Id. at 151.
'6 See id.
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places them under bureaucratic control, thereby enhancing both bureau-
cratic power and its potential abuse.
165
Indeed, combining bureaucratic prerogative with control over re-
sources logically facilitates corruption. This proposition is simply the re-
ciprocal form of another familiar premise: that capitalist separation of
centralized power and valuable national resources, through industry privati-
zation, deters corruption.166 While bureaucrats under either kind of system
may have motives to take bribes, 167 bureaucrats operating in the context of
heavily nationalized industries have more opportunities to do so. The
heightened role they play in the management of their nations' business de-
velopment gives them substantial access to and control over business op-
portunities-levels of access and control that would be held by private
hands under capitalist regimes. 161 Until and unless the ethos of patrimony is
extirpated around the world, these dynamics are virtual guarantors of cor-
ruption's longevity.
This is a serious problem. We have seen that bribery and corruption
are major challenges of the 21st Century. Our ability to face these chal-
lenges effectively will be crucial to all sectors of modem global society-to
businesses, governments, local communities, nongovernmental organiza-
tions, small groups, and individuals. Directly or indirectly, all of these
classes will be affected by the proliferation or the decline of corruption.
Legal scholarship is at the point where many of the basics have been
debated in some detail. The time is ripe for expansive examination of ma-
jor policy questions, and especially for examination of new and creative so-
lutions. The discussion in this article has attempted to focus attention on
some of the big questions in the anti-corruption debate that have not yet re-
ceived substantial or adequate attention, or that are novel, highly controver-
sial, and worthy of serious consideration.
165 See id.
166 Along these lines, Milton Friedman suggests that capitalist systems are necessary to
the maintenance of social and political freedoms, in part because capitalism separates the ac-
cumulation of wealth from centralized governmental authority. For detailed discussion of
this concept, see MILToN FRmDMAN, CAPITALISM Aim FREEDOM 7-21 (1962).
167 While motives for bureaucrats to take bribes certainly exist in both communist and
capitalist economies, the motives may be more compelling in the former than in the latter,
since capitalist systems are more likely to generate greater social wealth, and therefore bu-
reaucrats in capitalist economies are less likely to be motivated by need to solicit or accept
bribes.
168 See Mbaku, supra note 162, at 155 ("[R]egulation and ownership created opportuni-
ties for bureaucrats to appropriate national resources for their on use.").
